Quantum Key Distribution in OpenSSL by Papotti, Aurora
Quantum Key Distribution in OpenSSL










The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality assurance system
using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service.
UNIVERSITY OF TURKU
Department of Computing
Aurora Papotti: Quantum Key Distribution in OpenSSL
Master of Science in Technology Thesis, 53 p.
Security of Networked Systems
November 2021
Most of the current communications and systems rely on asymmetric cryptography,
which is used to share a unique secret key between two parties communicating, in
order to encrypt the information exchanged.
Recently, many researchers state that quantum computing will be a threat in 15-20
years. At the moment there is no quantum computer able to crack classical
cryptography, however, a solution to address the threat should be found as soon as
possible before classical cryptography reaches its expiration date, and all
communications and systems will be cracked.
Quantum cryptography is considered a problem, but from another perspective, it is
also the solution to it. In fact, this technology is strong enough to protect both from
quantum and classical attacks. Quantum cryptography is considered secure because
it is based on quantum physics laws.
The benefits of quantum cryptography, combined with the ones of symmetric
cryptography offer an alternative solution to the Key Exchange problem:
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). The technology is a protocol that describes a
cryptographic technique to exchange a secret key between two end
users/applications within a communication.
This thesis starts by presenting the quantum threat, and the reasons that make
quantum computing risky for classical communications and systems. Moreover, it
states the importance to invest resources in this field of research in order to find a
solution to address the problem once it will be a real risk.
Finally, I explain my contribution to Cefriel activities in the context of Quantum
Key Distribution. The internship activity described is a demonstrative approach to
integrate QKD technology into the OpenSSL library. The project aims to
demonstrate the effectiveness and the feasibility of using QKD technology in SSL
communications.
Keywords: Asymmetric Cryptography, Symmetric Cryptography, Quantum
Cryptography, Quantum Key Distribution, TLS/SSL, OpenSSL
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 The Quantum Threat 6
2.1 The current state of cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Brief History of Quantum Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Why quantum cryptography is a threat to classical cryptography . . . 9
2.4 Quantum threat solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4.1 Post-Quantum Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Quantum Key Distribution 15
3.1 Quantum computing and symmetric cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 What is Quantum Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 Quantum Key Distribution networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4 The limits of Quantum Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4 QKD in OpenSSL 23
4.1 TLS/SSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.1 Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
i
4.2 OpenSSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3 The ETSI QKD API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3.1 QKD Application Interface Specification Description . . . . . 31
4.3.2 QKD Application Interface API Specification . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4 Implementing QKD in OpenSSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.4.1 Approaches to add QKD support to OpenSSL . . . . . . . . . 36
4.5 Hacking the OpenSSL Diffie-Hellman engine to add QKD . . . . . . . 40
4.5.1 The qkd_engine_client.c file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.5.2 The qkd_engine_server.c file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.5.3 The qkd_engine_utils.c file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.6 QKD + OpenSSL Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.7 Encountered Challenges and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5 Conclusion 51
5.1 Future works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52




Technology is a powerful tool that helped us in developing as a society. Many
services, such as bank transaction, messaging services and online shopping, with
the progress of the Internet became digitalised, and this evolution introduced many
benefits but also it brought a new challenge: guarantee the secrecy of the information
exchanged, and stored.
Over the last years, cryptography allowed us to protect ourselves from
malicious attackers. Many services rely on a type of cryptography called
asymmetric cryptography, which is used to share a secret key between two
communicating parties that aim to exchange information secretly over an insecure
channel. This kind of cryptography has always been enough to guarantee security,
until the advent of Quantum Cryptography. The latter is based on quantum
physics laws, and many researchers state that it may be a threat to our current
cryptographic systems because it is more powerful. Quantum Cryptography is
considered a huge problem, however, from a different perspective it is also the
solution to it. In fact, quantum cryptography is secure against both "classical"
attacks and quantum attacks.
In the context of cyber security one of the biggest challenge is the Key Agreement
Problem: exchange a secret key between two users without being intercepted by an
eavesdropper. Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard took advantage of the quantum
computing’s benefits to propose Quantum Key Distribution: a protocol describing
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a new and secure cryptographic solution to the problem of exchanging a secret key
without being intercepted.
This thesis describes my contribution to Cefriel activities in the context of
Quantum Key Distribution. Cefriel, with the collaboration of Italtel, the
Polytechnic of Madrid, Telefonica, the Polytechnic of Milan, and CNR,
participated in the Quantum-Secure Net1 EIT Digital funded project in 2020. The
objective of the project was to develop a simple and flexible solution for
unconditionally insecure communication systems based on QKD technology, to
make them work with actual metropolitan networks based on optical fiber. Cefriel
developed two prototypal scenarios to demonstrate the usage of QKD technology:
• One scenario describes the usage in Blockchain context
• The other scenario describes the usage in SSL context.
Both scenarios aim to demonstrate that QKD technology can be applied both
to the finance market, and IoT (Internet of Things) or IIoT (Industrial IoT)
communications. On a broader level, the project can be adapted to any services or
technologies that need a symmetric key.
During my internship activity, I focused on the usage of Quantum Key
Distribution in the scenario of SSL, the aim was to use a QKD key as a pre-shared
key for the SSL protocol. Over the last 6 months, I implemented a dynamic library
to extend the OpenSSL library and to add support for the QKD technology. The
activity has been simulated through an ETSI 004 simulator implemented by the
University of Madrid to retrieve a QKD key, which is used as a secret key between
two parties communicating.
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of the thesis gives an insight
into the current state of classical cryptography and quantum cryptography. In
1https://www.eitdigital.eu/fileadmin/files/2020/factsheets/digital-tech/EIT-D
igital-Factsheet-Q-Secure-net.pdf
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particular, I described the cryptographic techniques which most services depend
upon to offer security, highlighting their weakness against quantum computing.
Moreover, I state the reasons why we should invest money and resources in the
research of quantum cryptography. In conclusion, the second part of the thesis
describes my internship activity at Cefriel, therefore, the implementation and
design choices of my solution to introduce QKD technology in the OpenSSL
library, the limitations of the solution, and some ideas for future works.
1.1 Motivation
This thesis aims to inform the reader about the quantum cryptography threat.
The current cryptographic techniques are considered weak against this new
technology, at the moment there are only theoretical demonstrations, however, it is
important to perform researches in order to be ready when the risk will become
practical. Government, industry, and academia are investing resources in projects
to find solutions to the problem of quantum computing. Among the different
projects, we find two main technologies: Quantum Key Distribution and
Post-Quantum Cryptography. This thesis focuses on the description of the first
technology, in particular, it proposes a solution to demonstrate an approach to add
Quantum Key Distribution support in the OpenSSL library. This solution does
not aim to offer a go-to-market product, however, it shows the effectiveness of
integrating the quantum technology into a widely used protocol such as TLS/SSL.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis brings contributions to Cefriel activities in the context of Quantum
Key Distribution. Last year Cefriel participated in the Quantum-Secure Net EIT
funded project, and they developed two prototypal scenarios to demonstrate possible
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usages of QKD technology: (i) one scenario shows its usage with Blockchains, (ii)
the other shows its usage in SSL communications. During my internship activity,
I had the opportunity to focus on the latest scenario. In this thesis, I demonstrate
the effectiveness of integrating Quantum Key Distribution into one of the most used
open-source SSL implementations: the OpenSSL library.
This thesis cannot be considered a contribution to the OpenSSL library, and the
OpenSSL community. The project here described involves the implementation of
a dynamic library that is loaded during the configuration of the OpenSSL library,
which means, it is an independent third party from the main library, the support of
the library’s community is not involved. I made this implementation choice in order
not to modify the source code, and take advantage of the maintenance and update
of the OpenSSL library from the OpenSSL maintainers.
Chapter 4 describes in detail the implementation and design choices made,
explaining the reasons for each choice. Moreover, in this part of the thesis, I state
the limitations of my work, giving possible ideas for future developments and
progresses.
1.3 Overview
This thesis gives a background about classical cryptography and quantum
cryptography, and it describes the problem of the current cryptographic
techniques’ weakness against the threat of quantum computing. In addition, a
personal internship activity is described to demonstrate a possible solution to the
problem. This work is organized as follow:
• Chapter 2 introduces some basic notions about classical cryptography and
quantum cryptography. Moreover, it explains the quantum threat problem
and the reasons we should invest in this research to find solutions in order to
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be ready for possible future attacks.
• Chapter 3 describes the Quantum Key Distribution protocol. I decided not to
focus on the implementation details of different protocols because I think it
was unnecessary for the purposes of the thesis, a general overview is enough
to understand the proposed work.
• Chapter 4 described my Internship activity at Cefriel. The reasons and
objectives of the project are described to begin with. In addition a general
background about TLS/SSL protocol, OpenSSL library, and ETSI APIs is
provided, in order to understand the technologies involved in the project. In
conclusion, I describe in detail the implementation choices made to develop
the proposed solution.
• Chapter 5 concludes this work with some final remarks and personal insights.
In addition, some ideas for possible future work are proposed.
2 The Quantum Threat
The first section of this chapter describes the current state of cryptography and
the classical cryptographic techniques. Most of the current systems are based on
asymmetric cryptography, therefore, a general overview about about this kind of
cryptography is given with the aim of helping the reader to fully understand the
context of this work.
Section 2.2 describes the birth of Quantum Cryptography with the purpose of
introducing the problem presented in Section 2.3: the Quantum Threat. Moreover,
Section 2.3 intends to warn the reader about the risks with quantum computing,
highlighting the importance of investing money and resources to study this
technology, and find appropriate solution to the problem.
Section 2.4 introduces two technologies that are research’s subject to address
the problem of quantum attacks. The two technologies described in this section are
Post-Quantum Cryptography, and Quantum Key Distribution.
2.1 The current state of cryptography
Everyone uses Internet to send messages, perform online transactions, and buy
online. All these tasks need a security mechanism in order to protect and keep
secret the information exchanged and stored for each user. When you open a new
chat on a messaging service like WhatsApp, have you ever noticed the message
"This conversation is end-to-end encrypted"?. This means that the conversation is
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readable only for the two parties communicating, there are no third parties able to
intercept the messages, and cryptography is accountable for making this happens.
Most of the current services are built upon cryptography to encrypt sensible
information/data; in particular, they are based on a type of cryptography which is
defined as public-key cryptography. The core function of public-key
cryptography (or asymmetric cryptography), resides in the use of a pair of
keys: a public key (which is is known to everyone), and a private key (which is
known only to the owner’s key). The generation of such keys is based on
mathematical problems defined as one-way functions [1]. A one-way function is a
function that is easy to compute given the input, but hard to compute in the
opposite side given the output. An example of such problems is the prime
factorization: it is easy to multiply two prime numbers, but it is really difficult to
compute the decomposition of a number to find the prime numbers that compose
it. If a person, or a computer, is able to solve these "hard" mathematical
problems, then they are able to bypass the security mechanism. Most of the
problems used in public-key cryptography are based on prime factorization (e.g.
RSA), discrete logarithm (e.g. Diffie-Hellman), and elliptic curve (e.g. ECC).
Although these algorithms are different from each other, they are based on a
unique broader problem: the hidden abelian group.
In order to crack a pure cryptographic system1 an attacker has two possibilities:
• Brute force attack: try all the possibilities to determine the right key that is
able to decrypt the message. This kind of attack takes time, which usually
depends on the key’s length. A brute force attack is always successful, however,
time is a big limitation for the attacker, which makes this attack inefficient.
• Finding the solution to the mathematical problem: this "attack" depends
strongly on the robustness of the one-way function. In particular, we define
1With the term pure I mean a system based on modern (classical) cryptography.
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unconditional computational security problems as those problems that
are impossible to solve no matter the attacker’s computational power. In
contrast, practical computational security problems are quite impossible
to solve with the current resources but may be easily breakable in the future [2].
2.2 Brief History of Quantum Cryptography
We have recently heard about Quantum Cryptography, and how it is slowly
becoming a threat to our system. Many researchers have claimed that in the
future (by now, not a too distant future) quantum computers will be able to
exploit modern cryptography [3] (this aspect is described in Section 2.3). Firstly, I
want to introduce quantum cryptography with a brief history of its origin.
Stephen Wiesner and Charles Bennett were two undergraduate students at
Brandeis University in the early 1960’, later the lives of the two students took
different ways. Wiesner graduated from Columbia University, and Bennett from
Harvard, despite this, they managed to keep in touch and meet regularly at the
latter’s communal house in Boston. One day Wiesner talked with Bennett about
his idea: using quantum mechanisms in banknotes, making it impossible to
counterfeit them according to the laws of nature. Wiesner’s idea was based on the
use of a quantum multiplexing channel, where one party could send two messages
to the receiving party in a way that would allow the latter to decide which message
to read, at the cost to destroy the other message irreversibly. The idea is described
in the paper Conjugate Coding [4], Wiesner tried to submit it to the IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory2, unfortunately, the article was rejected [5].
One day in late October 1979, at the 20th IEEE Symposium on the
Foundations of Computer Science, held in Puerto Rico, Charles Bennett mentioned
2https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/RecentIssue.jsp?punumber=18
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Wiesner’s idea to Gilles Brassard. The latter was scheduled to give a talk on
relativized cryptography, therefore, Bennett thought Brassard might be interested
in Wiesner’s findings [6]. The two researchers discovered how to incorporate the
idea of Wiesner: "The main breakthrough came when we realized that photons were
never meant to store information, but rather to transmit it" [7]. Bennett and
Brassard published the first ever paper on quantum cryptography, the article was
simply titled Quantum Cryptography and it was presented at Crypto ’82 annual
conference [8]. This publication raised interest in the original Wiesner’s paper,
which was finally published in 1983 on SIGACT News3. Finally in 1984, Bennett
and Brassard, building upon their work, proposed BB84, a method for secure
communication [5] [9].
2.3 Why quantum cryptography is a threat to
classical cryptography
The classical cryptography based on asymmetric encryption has always been
enough to protect systems from malicious attackers, but the evolution of quantum
cryptography is endangering the entire modern cryptographic system. At the
beginning, the quantum threat was considered only a theory, in fact, despite the
quantum algorithm for integers factorization developed by Peter Shor [10], with
the potential to decrypt RSA-encrypted communications [11], and several
experimental progresses since the late 1990s, many researchers believed that
"fault-tolerant quantum computing is still a rather distant dream" [12]. In contrast,
over the last years investment in quantum computing research has increased [13],
and as result, Google AI, in partnership with the U.S. National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), on the 23rd October 2019, claimed to have
3https://dl.acm.org/newsletter/sigact
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achieved quantum supremacy [14]. Moreover, in February 2019, IBM
commercialized IBM Q System One, the first remotely usable quantum computer.
Quantum cryptography is based on quantum physics’ laws. We all know the
bit, the unit information in binary computing, which can assume the value 0 or
1, representing two distinct tension levels. Instead, in quantum computing the unit
information is the qubit, whose value is a combination of 0 and 1, and may represent
the spin of the electron, or the polarization of a single photon [15].
Quantum computers are faster and powerful, they are able to solve some kinds
of problems more efficiently. According to some researches, the Shor algorithm, and
other quantum algorithms, show that the time required to decrypt the keys used in
asymmetric encryption increases slightly at the extension of cryptographic keys. A
practical example could be the hidden abelian group, this problem can be solved in
an exponential time with classical computing, instead, quantum computing is able
to solve it in a polynomial time, respect to the key’s length. All the algorithms
that are considered practical computational security (e.g. RSA, ECC, AES) can be
cracked in a time that is independent of the keys’ length; the computing power and
the time involved in the computation are normal [16] [17] [18].
At this point, we have to ask our-self: why do we need to invest in quantum
research? Most of the researches show theoretical attacks, but the hypothesis that
a quantum computer with enough power to exploit the modern cryptography will
be created, is raising interest in this field of research. Moreover, while quantum
cryptography is considered the threat on one side, it is also the weapon against
it. In fact, quantum cryptography is secure against both classical and quantum
attacks. However, there are some limitations with quantum cryptography: (i) both
parties involved in a communication, need to have access to a quantum computer,
(ii) that is quite expensive at the moment, therefore, it is inefficient and not very
feasible [19]. Quantum cryptography is at an intermediary-advanced stage, there
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are already some practical uses of it, and it has made a lot of progress over the
years, however, its cost makes impracticable to absolutely replace all the modern
cryptographic systems. Although the use of quantum cryptography in all contexts is
something considered for a later future [20], there are several reasons why we should
study quantum cryptography:
• Quantum cryptography is a new science and technology: companies,
governments, and university are approaching it in different ways, therefore, it
is not possible to have an accurate time estimation of when quantum
computing will reach a level that will compromise the classical cryptographic
systems. However, we have to be prepared once a powerful quantum
computer will be created. We need to study, implement and test this new
technology now to be reactive to the future threat.
• The migration from a modern system to a new one is always a tough process, in
particular, when we are talking about cryptographic systems. Many years are
required to reach the transition to a new technology, or simply an update of an
algorithm. Moreover, many resources are involved: the entire infrastructure
needs to be changed, the developers need to be trained, and old applications
and new cryptographic standards need to be re-designed, not to mention the
deployment of the new solution.
• Until now we have talked about the protection of information exchanged
between two parties, but we should also be concerned about the protection of
stored data. Companies are storing a huge amount of data, that is encrypted
according to government legislation (e.g. GDPR). There are some data that
we can consider irrelevant, but others contain sensitive information, and the
main goal is to maintain their secrecy. This kind of data may include
personal or health information (personally identifiable information/personal
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healthcare information PII/PHI), or government information, therefore, a
"lifetime" encryption is required.
2.4 Quantum threat solution
Currently, there is not a technology or a quantum computer that is capable of
cracking our codes-practical, therefore, it is impossible to estimate an expiration
date for the security of modern communications/systems. Nevertheless, many
experts insist that the time to act and be prepared is now. In particular, the
mathematician Michele Mosca of the Institute for Quantum Computing at the
University of Waterloo in Canada declares that the chance that quantum threat
will occur in 10 or 20 years is not a risk we can ignore, it is a threat to the global
economy, and a defense mechanism should be planned as soon as possible [21].
Previously, in Section 2.1, I mentioned that most of the modern cryptographic
systems on which we depend upon (e.g. to secure communications or to perform
online transactions), rely on hard mathematical problems to solve, such as prime
factorization, or discrete algorithms. These mathematical problems are the reason
that makes modern cryptography enough strong to protect ourselves from cyber
attacks. However, while these problems are impossible for today’s computers to
solve, it also leads to possible future risks. Imagine that an attacker is able to collect,
and store sensible information encrypted with classical cryptographic techniques; if
the attacker in 10 or 15 years manages to use a quantum computer, they will be
able to decrypt the data.
Government, industry, academia are investing money and resources to prepare
the world for this post-quantum era, in particular, Germany has invested €2 billion
in quantum computing and related technologies over five years, funding over seven
initiatives and incentivising collaboration between industry and academia [22].
The particularity of Quantum Cryptography is its dual role: (i) on one side is
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considered a threat, (ii) on the other side it is the defense against both classical and
quantum attacks. Therefore, if quantum computers are considered a problem (they
can be used to break classical cryptography), they are also the solution for it (they
can be used to build strong cryptography). In particular, the protocol Quantum
Key Distribution was invented to address the problem of key agreement within a
communication. Quantum Key Distribution is explained in Chapter 3.
There is another project run by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), that focuses on a different technology: Post-Quantum
Cryptography [23]. In the next section, I present Post-Quantum Cryptography.
2.4.1 Post-Quantum Cryptography
The main characteristic of quantum cryptography is its power, in fact, it is based
on quantum physics laws that make it unbreakable no matter how powerful the
computer owned by an attacker is. There is no computing power, or algorithm
that can crack this cryptography. Therefore, Quantum Cryptography is also being
studied as a solution to deal with the future quantum threat. However, there are
some side effects that make the use of Quantum Cryptography inefficient (at the
moment). Both parties within a communication need to have access to a quantum
computer, to begin with. In addition, the cost of this technology is still high, and it
is not affordable for everyone: this makes quantum cryptography impracticable and
inefficient.
Quantum Cryptography’s side effects have prompted the research to focus on
another type of cryptography: Post-Quantum Cryptography. This kind of
cryptography can be performed with classical computers, but it is considered
secure against attacks performed by quantum computers.
Section 2.3 describes public-key cryptography, which is based on mathematical
problems that are hard to solve, however, it has been proven theoretically that
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modern cryptography can be cracked with Shor’s algorithm. Post-quantum
cryptography can be considered as classical cryptography because it can be
performed with classical computers, however, it is stronger than asymmetric
cryptography because it is based on different mathematical principles that are
difficult to solve even by a quantum computer. The terms quantum cryptography
and post-quantum Cryptography can be easily misunderstood, but these two
technologies have nothing in common; one needs a quantum computer to be
performed, and the other does not.
Some reliable post-quantum ciphers against Shor’s algorithm have been
implemented [24] [25], however, post-quantum cryptography lacks the adjective
unconditional computational security. It cannot be demonstrated that the
post-quantum cryptographic algorithms are unbreakable in a polynomial time [26].
Like public-key cryptography, there is no mathematical proof of the effectiveness of
this technology against quantum computers. Nevertheless, because of the
difficulties with quantum cryptography as a solution to the quantum threat, it is
interesting to investigate other types of solutions that can increase the security
level of the modern communications and systems a bit. In addition, post-quantum
cryptography fills the gap in the worst case scenario where the attacker is the only
party that can have access to a quantum computer, and the victim cannot have
access to it.
3 Quantum Key Distribution
This chapter begins with Section 3.1, which focuses on showing the benefits of
symmetric cryptography combined with those of quantum computing to obtain an
optimal cryptographic solution to the key agreement problem. The solution
described in this chapter, to address the quantum threat, is the Quantum Key
Distribution protocol, which is presented in Section 3.2. I decided not to describe
the different implementations of Quantum Key Distribution because I used this
technology as a "black-box" for my project. The main goal of my internship
activity was just to incorporate this technology into SSL communications.
Section 3.3 presents several implementations of Quantum Key Distribution
systems. These QKD networks have been developed by research institutes in
different countries, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of QKD technology.
This section also aims to introduce some security issues that Quantum Key
Distribution has to deal with. In conclusion, these challenges are described in
Section 3.4.
3.1 Quantum computing and symmetric
cryptography
Until now we have taken into account only asymmetric cryptography, the attacks
we have mentioned do not concern symmetric cryptography (the same encryption
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key is used by both sides). The theorem of Shannon developed in 1949
demonstrates that symmetric cryptography allows to obtain the perfect
secrecy [27]. The benefits of quantum cryptography combined with those of
symmetric cryptography, lead to a protocol for sharing an encryption key between
two parties in a secure manner: Quantum Key Distribution. Before discussing this
protocol, a brief recap of asymmetric cryptography and symmetric cryptography is
provided below.
Public-key cryptography guarantees confidentiality. In a scenario where one
party (Alice) wants to send a secret message to another (Bob), the workflow is as
follows:
1. Alice encrypts a message with Bob’s public key.
2. Alice sends the message to Bob.
3. Once Bob received the message, he uses his private key to decrypt the message.
The communication in this scenario is unidirectional, Alice is not able to read Bob’s
messages because she doesn’t know his private key. Asymmetric cryptography is
slower than symmetric cryptography, therefore, it is usually used to share a secret
key between two parties: Alice sends a message to Bob which is the secret key, the
latter is used to encrypt and decrypt all the communication between the two parties.
In Figure 3.1 there is a schema that summarizes the functionality of asymmetric
cryptography and symmetric cryptography.
The Key Establishment Mechanism (KEM), is the method by which
cryptography keys are exchanged, which is also the main challenge in symmetric
cryptography: exchanging the secret key between two parties without being
intercepted. Therefore, asymmetric cryptography is used in the initial phase of
communication to exchange the secret key without interference. A common
scheme used to share the secret key was initially proposed by Diffie Hellman [28],
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Figure 3.1: At the top of the figure, symmetric encryption with the same key shared
between two parties. At the bottom, asymmetric encryption with two different keys:
the private key and the public key. The public key is used for the encryption and
the private key is used for the decryption.
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now it is one of the foundations on which the SSL protocol is based.
3.2 What is Quantum Key Distribution
In Section 2.2 I briefly explained the story of quantum cryptography and the
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol invented by Charles Bennett and
Gilles Brassard in 1984. The protocol describes an alternative cryptographic
solution to the key agreement problem: sharing a secret key between two parties
without being intercepted. In contrast to public-key cryptography, QKD has been
demonstrated to be unconditionally secure [29][30].
Quantum Key Distribution takes advantage of the quantum properties of photons
to exchange a symmetric cryptographic key, which is used to encrypt messages
exchanged over a "traditional" channel. The security of QKD resides in the universal
natural laws that are reliable against any computing power, algorithm, or quantum
computer. One principle that guarantees secrecy with quantum cryptography is a
fundamental law of quantum cryptography: "it is impossible to gain information
about non-orthogonal quantum states without perturbing these states" [31]. This
means that the security in this kind of system resides in the event that an attacker
tries to intercept the information exchanged. If an eavesdropper, commonly called
Eve, tampers on the quantum channel connecting two legitimate users, Alice and
Bob, she will leave traces of errors in the key exchange. In this case, Alice and Bob
can decide whether to exchange a new key or interrupt the transmission.
Another benefit of QKD is related to information security, in fact, it is
demonstrated to be an information-theoretically-secure system, which means that
the system is unbreakable even if the attacker has unlimited computing power.
Since the security of a QKD system does not rely on difficult mathematical
problems to solve, the system is secure against both classical attacks and quantum
attacks.
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The last, but not least, property that QKD benefits from when it is used to
generate several encryption keys in a row, is called forward-secrecy: all the different
keys that are exchanged over a QKD link are independent of each other. Therefore,
even if an attacker is able to compromise a key, he/she is not able to compromise all
the others. This characteristic is highly appreciated both for guaranteeing a higher
security level in networks, and for storing long-term data.
Basic principles of QKD
In this section, without going into details, I briefly describe the general structure
and the basic principle of a QKD system: the QKD link. A QKD link is a point-
to-point connection between two peers that want to exchange secret keys. A basic
implementation of a QKD link consists of:
• quantum channel: an optical fiber channel capable of transmitting quantum
information (qubit) between two users, Alice and Bob.
• classical channel: a classical communication channel that is public, but
authenticated, between the two parties to perform the phases after the secret
key is being exchanged.
• exchange key protocol: a protocol that takes advantage of quantum
properties to ensure security by detecting interceptions or errors, and
evaluating the amount of information lost or intercepted.
The workflow of a QKD system can be described as follows. Alice sends over
the quantum channel a sequence of non-orthogonal quantum states of light encoded
by a random stream of classical bits. Once Bob has received these quantum states,
he performs some measurements and shares some classical data correlated with
Alice’s random stream. Then, the classical channel is used to test the correlations
between Bob’s data and Alice’s data. High correlations statistically imply that no
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Figure 3.2: Schema of a basic QKD system. The QKD link is composed by a
quantum channel, and a classical channel. Two users, Alice and Bob, communicate
by means of the QKD link to share a secret key.
eavesdropping has taken place on the quantum channel. In the opposite case, it is
necessary to abort the key generation process and start it again.
3.3 Quantum Key Distribution networks
Some research institutes over different countries invested enormous resources to
implement Quantum Key Distribution systems, in order to demonstrate the
effectiveness and feasibility of QKD technology. The first QKD network is the
DARPA quantum network, which was proposed by BBN Technologies in
collaboration with Harvard and Boston universities. DARPA quantum network
has 10 quantum nodes and adopts a hybrid network type (i.e., active optical
switch and trusted node networks) [32] [33].
In 2004, the project SECOQC QKD network was launched. This project
defines practical applications of QKD networks with the aim of analyzing QKD
networks’ issues, in particular security aspects, communication protocols, design
and architecture, and implementation methods [32] [34].
Another example is the Tokyo UQCC (Updating Quantum Cryptography and
Communication) QKD testbed network launched in Japan in October 2010. The key
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distribution service of this QKD network was used to perform a live demonstration
of secure TV conferencing [32].
There are plenty of experiments and studies that provided beneficial results in
terms of the network framework, key generation rate, communication distance, and
routing protocol. However, Quantum Key Distribution presents some issues and
challenges and issues that need to be addressed; in particular, these issues involve
the security aspect. The most important security challenges that Quantum Key
Distribution has to deal with are:
• the lack of a point-to-multipoint mechanism in QKD networks.
• the lack of a suitable security interface between the classical end
users/applications and the quantum nodes.
3.4 The limits of Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum Key Distribution seems to perfectly guarantee the integrity of the keys,
however, it does not mean that unhackable communications are within our reach.
Section 3.3 describes several Quantum Key Distribution networks that have been
implemented over the last years. However, while QKD technology has many benefits,
it has to deal with some security issues that are subjects of research. The first major
issue is the lack of a point-to-multipoint mechanism in QKD networks, in fact, all the
QKD networks allow two remote end users/applications to distribute session keys,
providing a point-to-point key distribution service: there is no point-to-multipoint
mechanism [32].
Another issue is the lack of an adequate security interface between the classical
end users/applications and the quantum nodes. In Section 2.4, I mention the high
construction cost of quantum technology, which makes it unfeasible for an end
user/application to have access to a dedicated quantum node to access the service
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implemented by a QKD network. Therefore, in order to have access to a quantum
node, several end users/application need to share one quantum node, which means
they still use a classical network to link a quantum node. It is important to design
a security mechanism for the communication between the end users/applications
and the quantum nodes [32].
Moreover, Quantum Key Distribution needs relays, which leads to another
weakness. When two communicating parties are far apart, the QKD networks need
repeaters to transmit messages, and these repeaters may be a hackable point. In
addition, the use of routers and hubs is necessary in QKD networks to route
messages, which makes them another weak point [35].
4 QKD in OpenSSL
Over the last 6 months, I contributed to Cefriel activities in the context of
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Cefriel participated in the Quantum-Secure
Net EIT Digital funded project in 2020. Its objective was the development of a
prototype of a QKD transmitter/receiver. The project, whose activity leader was
Italtel, included the Polytechnic of Madrid, Telefonica, the Polytechnic of Milan,
Cefriel, and CNR. The QKD is a secure communication method that involves key
distribution using quantum derivation techniques. Using this device, two entities
that want to share a message and want it to be accessible only to them can exploit
a particular type of key to ensure that no malicious third party has intercepted the
message. QKD is the only known encryption method that, under certain
conditions, and combined with a one-time pad, has unconditionally secured
encryption symmetric key protocol and offers forward secrecy. The objective of my
internship was to develop a complete software stack of an IPSEC/TLS over PSK
library, adapting existing open-source SSL implementation. The activity is
simulated through an ETSI 004 simulator.
This chapter begins with Section 4.1, which aims to give some basic notions of
TLS/SSL protocol, providing the reader with an overview of SSL communications.
Section 4.2 describes the OpenSSL library, the most popular open source
implementation of the SSL and TLS protocols. The Section 4.3 briefly introduces
the ETSI QKD APIs, then, how they should be implemented. These three sections
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aim to explain to the reader the technologies involved in the project, explained in
detail in the following sections of Chapter 4, in order to make easier the
comprehension of the presented work.
In Section 4.4 I explain the general structure of the project, and the different
approaches to introduce the QKD technology into the OpenSSL library. In
particular, I present the motivation of my implementation choices. The Section 4.5
describes in detail the structure of the project, and which procedure I followed to
implement it. In addition, Section 4.6 explains the workflow of the presented
solution, providing a working demonstration.
Finally, Section 4.7 aims to present the challenges encountered during the
development of this work, and the limitations of the final solution achieved.
4.1 TLS/SSL
Secure Sockets Layer protocol (SSL) was designed to provide secure
communications over a computer network. Nowadays, SSL is deprecated and its
successor Transport Layer Security (TLS) has replaced it. This protocol is mainly
used in all situations where application layer information needs to be end-to-end
encrypted before TCP transmission. For example, it is used as the security layer in
HTTPS, and in applications such as email, instant messaging, and voice over IP.
TLS was first proposed by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in 1999, now,
the current version is TLS 1.3, and it was defined in August 2018. Before TLS, the
SSL protocol was developed by Netscape Communications with the goal of adding
the HTTPS protocol to their navigator web browser. Earlier SSL specifications were
helpful in implementing the TLS protocol.
SSL is obsolete, but since it is the first implementation of securing the application
layer messagges before transportation, and the later TLS is based on it, the two terms
are used interchangeably. However, the two protocols are different, in particular, the
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main difference relies on the level of security; TLS is an upgraded and more secure
version of SSL, therefore, it is widely used throughout the Internet. A server can
guarantee different versions of SSL and TLS, however, using the highest version of
the protocol is recommended to avoid vulnerabilities related to older versions (e.g.
SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0). Today, when someone refers to the protocol with the term SSL
they actually mean TLS, in order to be consistent, through the section I will refer
to the subject protocol with the term TLS.
The purpose of the TLS protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity between
two or more communicating parties (e.g. computer applications). The protocol runs
on top of the transport layer in the TCP/IP model, and it consists of two layers:
the TLS record protocol, and the TLS handshake protocol.
4.1.1 Workflow
The protocol is used within a communication across a network between a Client-
Server application, the aim is to provide privacy and data integrity against tampering
and eavesdropping. As I mentioned previously, the protocol itself is the composition
of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake protocol. At
the lowest layer the TLS Record Protocol is implemented , and it offers a secure
connection with two properties:
• Private connection: in order to guarantee secrecy, symmetric cryptography is
used for data encryption (e.g. AES, RC4, etc.). The keys are based on a
secret negotiated by the TLS Handshake Protocol, and they are unique for
each different connection.
• Reliable connection: a keyed MAC is included in the message to provide data
integrity. Secure hash functions (e.g. SHA-1, etc.) are used for MAC
computations. Moreover, the Record Protocol can operate without
encryption, differently, it cannot operate without a MAC.
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The TLS Record Protocol is an encapsulation of the higher protocols, such as
the TLS Handshake Protocol. The latter ensures authentication and negotiation
of encryption algorithms and cryptographic keys between server and client, before
the first byte of data is transmitted or received by the application protocol. The
connection security provided by the Handshake Protocol has three properties:
• The peer’s identity is authenticated by means of asymmetric (public key)
cryptography (e.g. RSA, DSA, etc.). Authentication may be optional but is
required at least for one of the peers.
• The shared secret negotiated between the client and the server is inaccessible
to eavesdroppers. Even if an attacker who is able to place himself in the middle
of the communication, he is not able to obtain the shared secret.
• There is no attacker who can modify the negotiation without being detected
by the communicating parties. Therefore, the negotiation is reliable.
In the next two sections, I briefly explain the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS
Handshake Protocol.
TLS Record protocol
Once the Record Protocol has received the data from the application layer, several
operations are performed:
1. Fragmentation: the data is fragmented into blocks. A sequence number is
added to each block to protect against attacks that attempt to reorder data.
2. Compression: the data is compressed according to the algorithm negotiated
during the handshake phase.
3. Add MAC: a MAC is applied to the data to guarantee data integrity of the
outgoing messages.
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4. Encryption: the data is encrypted using the cryptographic keys and
algorithms negotiated during the handshake phase.
5. Append TLS Record Header: a TLS Record Protocol header is applied to
the data.
As final step, the data is sent to the TCP protocol of the transport layer for
the transmission. In case the data is an incoming message, the reverse process in
performed.
TLS Handshake protocol
The TLS Handshake Protocol’s aim is to negotiate the security parameters (e.g.
encryption keys and cryptographic algorithms) of a data transfer session. It consists
of a series of sequential messages; the procedure (shown in Figure 4.1) describes a
basic handshake with only the server authenticated (the client is not authenticated).
The provided description refers to TLS 1.2 handshake.
1. Client Hello (client): the client starts the TLS handshake with a ClientHello
message specifying:
• the highest TLS protocol version supported by itself
• a list of supported cipher suites and compression methods
• a random number
• a session ID in case a client attempts to perform a resumed handshake
2. Server Hello (server): the server replies with a ServerHello message
specifying:
• the chosen protocol version: it should be the highest that both client and
server support.
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• the chosen cipher suite and compression method from the list offered by
the client.
• a random number
• a session ID to allow or confirm a resumed handshake.
3. Server Certificates (server): the server sends his digital certificate to prove
its identity.
4. Server Hello Done (server): a ServerHelloDone message is sent by the server
to indicate the negotiation handshake is done.
5. Client Key Exchange Message (client): this message sent by the client
may contain a PreMaster secret, which is encrypted using the server’s public
key.
6. Key Generation (client/server): The client and the server use the random
numbers and the PreMaster secret to generate a master secret. All the
symmetric encryption keys, or session keys, used in this connection are
obtained from the master secret.
7. Cipher Spec. Exchange (client): this message notifies the server that all the
following messages will be encrypted using the negotiated keys and algorithms.
8. Finished (client): this is the first encrypted message, moreover, it contains
a hash and MAC of the entire conversation. The server has to attempt to
decrypt the message and verify the hash and MAC. If one of the two fails, the
connection should be dropped.
9. Cipher Spec. Exchange (server): this message notifies the client that all the
following messages will be encrypted using the negotiated keys and algorithms.
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10. Finished (server): the server sends his Finished message. The client has
to perform the same decryption and verification procedure that the server
performed previously.
Figure 4.1: TLS Handshake Protocol phase
TLS 1.3 Handshake
Differently from TLS 1.2 handshake, there is only one round trip. The client sends
a ClientHello message containing a list of supported ciphers according to client’s
preference order, moreover, it makes a guess on the key algorithm that will be
used, in this way, it immediately shares a possible secret key. The server replies
with a ServerHello message containing its key, a certificate, the chosen cipher and
the finished message. Finally, once the client has received the server’s Finished
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message, it sends a Finished message too. Server and Client are both coordinated
on which cipher suite to use.
4.2 OpenSSL
OpenSSL provides two tools: (i) a SSL toolkit for the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols, (ii) and a general-purpose
cryptography library. It is a software library widely used by Internet servers,
including a lot of HTTPS websites. The library is written in the C programming
language and is licensed under an Apache-style license, which means that users are
free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes subject to some
simple license conditions.
The OpenSSL project, based on a fork of SSLeay by EriAndrew Young and Tim
Hudson, and was founded in 1998, the founding members were Mark Cox, Ralf
Engelschall, Stephen Henson, Ben Laurie, and Paul Sutton. Actually the OpenSSL
management committee is composed by 7 people, and there are 17 developers.
4.3 The ETSI QKD API
The acronym ETSI QKD API stands for European Telecommunications Standards
Organization1 (ETSI) Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Application Programming
Interface (API). These APIs are necessary to interface from the QKD consumer (end
application/user) to the QKD provider (the QKD device), and vice versa.
1https://www.etsi.org/
CHAPTER 4. QKD IN OPENSSL 31
4.3.1 QKD Application Interface Specification Description
Figure 4.2: QKD Application Interface and peer relationships. Sites A and B
represent security perimeters at each site (simple schema).
In Figure 4.2 there is a single QKD link enclosed by a red dashed box, the two
endpoints reside at site A and site B. Each site includes a single application (the
yellow box), and a single QKD Module enclosed by a blue box. The QKD Module
implements the QKD protocol (the red box) used to produce QKD keys, that are
managed by the QKD Key Manager peer (represented by the green box). In this
case the QKD API is used by the single peer application to acquire identical sets of
secure keys on demand [36].
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Figure 4.3: QKD Application Interface and peer relationships. Sites A and B
represent security perimeters at each site (complex schema).
A more complex (and general) scheme is shown In Figure 4.3. There are two
sites inside a network that contain two applications. A single QKD link formed by
QKD Module A3 and QKD Module B1 connects Site A and Site B. The other QKD
modules’ endpoints are not shown in the figure. The QKD Key Servers (the blue
boxes) represent a network layer Key Manager and their objectives are to manage
keys between endpoints, and to deliver identical sets of keys to these endpoints for
the peer applications. In this QKD API a secure key is guaranteed from the QKD
Key Manager peer (link layer), to the QKD Key Server (network layer), as well as
from the QKD Key Server to the applications [36].
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4.3.2 QKD Application Interface API Specification
OPEN_CONNECT
A (Key_stream_ID) association is reserved for a set
of future keys at both endpoints of the QKD link.
Moreover, a set of parameters is established to define the
expected levels of key service. OPEN_CONNECT() should
be a blocking function, no further operations can be
performed until both peers are connected or until the
timeout value is exceeded.
CLOSE
This function terminates an association established for
a certain Key_stream_ID. After, no more keys can
be allocated for this Key_stream_ID. Since there is
timing differences between the endpoints of the link, this
operation will take place at another time, therefore, any
unused key should be kept until that occurs and then
discarded, or the time to live value of the QoS parameter
is exceeded.
GET_KEY
This API is used to obtain the amount of key material
requested for a specific key_stream_ID. The return
value can be a key_buffer parameter containing the
fixed amount of requested key, or an error message in
case of failure. The GET_KEY() function may be called
as often as desired, and the QKD key manager should
reply at the bit rate specified in the QoS parameter, or
at the best rate the system can manage.
Table 4.1: Brief description of the API functions that a QKD key manager has to
implement as application interface
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4.4 Implementing QKD in OpenSSL
In this section I explain in detail the implementation of the solution to introduce
the QKD technology into the OpenSSL library, guaranteeing secure communications
between two parties, through the TLS/SSL protocol. The peculiarity resides in the
use of a secret key previously exchanged in a secure way thanks to the use of an
ETSI emulator.
The scenario presented aims to demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of
introducing QKD technology in a real context such as TLS/SSL protocol, which is
the core of all secure communications.
Figure 4.4: Schema of QKD technology integrated with TLS. The dashed green box
is the ETSI emulator, and the dashed red box is the TLS component, which retrieves
the QKD key from the emulator.
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QKD
The role of the Quantum Key Distribution method is played by the ETSI 004
emulator implemented by the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, which aims to
provide a QKD key: the secret key shared between two users like Alice and Bob.
The ETSI emulator has been downloaded in a local copy, and to execute the
process to retrieve the QKD key, a python script is used to start the procedure
(Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5: Schema of the QKD system. The python script share_key.py is
responsible to run the ETSI 004 simulator, the output is the QKD key retrieved.
TLS/SSL with Pre-Shared Key
Once the ETSI emulator has finished its process, the obtained QKD key is passed
to Alice and Bob. The shared secret is obtained before the TLS connections, and it
is used by the two users to exchange messages over a channel, which is considered
secure thanks to the advantages of QKD (Figure 4.6).
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However, this work is not risk-free, and some clarifications are necessary. The
QKD key retrieved from the ETSI emulator, and shared between Alice and Bob,
is passed over a socket communication, which means that the transmission of the
QKD key relies on classical cryptography, to begin with. This implementation choice
lacks security, but it is enough for proof of concept purposes, it demonstrates the
feasibility of introducing QKD technology into the OpenSSL library. Moreover, this
work only describes a demonstrative approach; the goal is not to achieve a go-to-
market solution.
Finally, due to lack of resources, Alice and Bob lie on the same virtual machine,
therefore, the server used for the communications, and for SSL certificates, is the
local host of the virtual machine. Of course, in a real scenario, Alice and Bob are
physically in two different geographical places, therefore, it would be necessary to
introduce a VPN tunnel between the two locations and above all create a server that
allows communication with appropriate certificates. However, the implementation
of the project in a wider context is out of scope for the purposes of this thesis,
moreover, for time and resources reasons, it was not possible to develop it. The
final solution achieved is good enough to demonstrate an approach to use QKD
technology in TLS/SSL communications.
4.4.1 Approaches to add QKD support to OpenSSL
In order to extend the OpenSSL library to add support for the QKD technology in
OpenSSL using the ETSI QKD API there are two different possibilities:
• create an OpenSSL engine: in this case we can simply "abuse" an existing
classical protocol like Diffie-Hellman. Therefore the solution would be to hack
the existing engine-based extension mechanism for Diffie-Hellman.
• modify the OpenSSL state machine: in this case we should introduce
QKD as a new first-class key exchange protocol.
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Figure 4.6: The QKD Key obtained by the ETSI emulator is used as symmetric
encryption key in TLS/SSL.
Hacking existing engine-based extension mechanism for Diffie-Hellman
The OpenSSL engine mechanism allows third parties to extend the OpenSSL engine.
The engine is an extension that can be implemented as a dynamic library (.dylib files
on macOS or .so files on Linux), and it is loaded during the OpenSSL initialization
without modifying the OpenSSL source code itself. OpenSSL configuration files are
used to control which extensions should to be loaded into OpenSSL. This solution is
simple, and since we do not make any changes to the source code, it allows to keep
the OpenSSL library updated and maintained according to the official releases.
OpenSSL engines were created with the intent of offloading time-consuming
cryptographic operations from the default software implementation in OpenSSL,
using special-purpose crypto acceleration hardware instead. The library’s
maintainers have decided a-priori which operations should be offloaded. In order to
offload these specific cryptographic operations, some APIs have been implemented.
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The engine APIs allow a dynamically loaded engine to register a callback function
that OpenSSL will call when it needs to be performed. This registered function is
used instead of OpenSSL’s default software implementation.
In my current implementation of QKD support in OpenSSL I decided to use the
engine mechanism, in order to avoid modifying the OpenSSL source code (approach
explained in the next section). However, engines for QKD protocols are not currently
supported in OpenSSL, therefore, it is necessary to "hack" an existing classical
protocol. In my case I decided to "abuse" of Diffie-Hellaman API (DH). The use of
this approach avoids implementing the whole state machine for the engine: OpenSSL
does it for you.
In order to overload the Diffie-Hellman protocol it is necessary to overload the
proper callbacks in the DH_METHOD structure. In my case I overloaded two callback
functions:
• The Diffie-Hellman compute_key engine callback: this one is called to perform
the first step of Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which is choosing a private key
and computing the corresponding public key. In my case I do not need the
private and the public key, therefore I hacked this callback by simply defining
a fixed pair of private and public keys.
• The Diffie-Hellman generate_key engine callback: this one is called to
perform the second part of Diffie Hellman key exchange, which is generating
the shared secret using the pairs private-public keys of the parties involved in
the communication, and the negotiated Diffie-Hellman parameters (g and p
parameters). I hacked this callback to instead open a socket communication
with the QKD app of the ETSI simulator to retrieve the QKD key.
CHAPTER 4. QKD IN OPENSSL 39
Figure 4.7: Schema of the implemented OpenSSL engine to introduce QKD
technology into OpenSSL
Introduce QKD as a new first-class key exchange protocol
OpenSSL engines can only be used to accelerate a pre-determinated set of operations
in existing cryptographic algorithms. As a result of how engines are implemented in
OpenSSL it is not possible to use them to introduce a completely new key exchange
algorithms such as QKD.
The way I have adopted to introduce QKD support does not affect the OpenSSL
source code (summarized in the previous section), however, this solution cannot be
consider a go-to market solution. The proper way to introduce QKD into OpenSSL
would be to modify the source code, introducing QKD as a first-class abstraction in
OpenSSL. An engine for QKD (not to hack Diffie-Hellman) would still be necessary
because usually the QKD provider is implemented on an external device reachable
through the ETSI API.
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4.5 Hacking the OpenSSL Diffie-Hellman engine to
add QKD
In this section I explain in detail how I hacked the existing OpenSSL
Diffie-Hellman engine. In order to hack the engine it is necessary to overload the
two callback functions of the DH_METHOD structure: compute_key engine callback,
and generate_key engine callback. The library OpenSSL is huge, and it is very
difficult to understand which callback functions should be overloaded. Luckily,
while I was doing research on extending the OpenSSL library, I found the website
of the Pan-European Quantum Internet Hackathon held on November 5-6th 20192,
and organized by RIPE labs. A github repository with a mock implementation of
the ETSI API, and a description of approaches to extend the OpenSSL library,
was offered for the challenge. From their guidelines I considered the advise to
"abuse" the existing engine-based extension mechanism for Diffie-Hellman.
Moreover, in order to understand the how engines work in OpenSSL, and to have a
general insight into the library, I used the following resources:
• OpenSSL wiki main page3
• OpenSSL wiki libcrypto main page4
• OpenSSL wiki Diffie-Hellman5
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• OpenSSL wiki SSL and TLS tutorial7
• OpenSSL man page for engines8
• OpenSSL man page for DH_generate_key engine callback9
• OpenSSL man page for DH_compute_key engine callback10
• Gost-engine/engine GitHub repo containing an OpenSSL engine
implementation11
The implementation of the OpenSSL engine to add QKD is structured on three
different files:
• qkd_engine_client.c: this file contains the engine code that is unique to the
client. It includes the implementation of the callback functions compute_key
and generate_key
• qkd_engine_server.c: this file contains the engine code that is unique to the
server. It includes the implementation of the compute_key and generate_key
• qkd_engine_utils.c: this file contains the engine code that is common to
the client and the server. It includes the implementation of the function to
bind the engine to the OpenSSL library, and the functions managing the socket
communication between the ETSI emulator and the peer’s (further information
in Section 4.6).
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4.5.1 The qkd_engine_client.c file
The qkd_engine_client.c file contains the engine code that is used by the client.
In the file there are implemented three different functions:
• client_generate_key(): this function overload the DH_generate_key()
function. It simply define the pair of private-public keys for the client. Since
the pair of keys is not fundamental for our purposes, I decided to used two
different fixed values, respectively for the private key and the public key.
• client_compute_key(): this function overload the DH_compute_key()
function. This function is fundamental because is the one responsible for
defining the shared-secret, therefore the symmetric key used for the
communication between the client and the server. The function implements a
server socket listening on the 2300 port (running on localhost), and
waiting to receive the QKD key from the QKD app of the ETSI emulator.
• client_engine_bind(): this function is used to bind the client engine to the
library OpenSSL. It is necessary to call the overload dynamic library instead
of the standard library implementation.
1 /∗∗
2 ∗ Ca l l b a c k r e g i s t e r e d i n the c l i e n t OpenSSL eng i n e which i s c a l l e d
3 ∗ when OpenSSL needs the eng i n e to g en e r a t e a D i f f i e −Hel lman p r i v a t e −
4 ∗ −key and to d e r i v e the D i f f i e −Hel lman p u b l i c key from i t .
5 ∗
6 ∗ Retu rns 1 on succe s s , 0 on f a i l u r e .
7 ∗/
8 s t a t i c i n t c l i e n t_gene ra t e_key (DH ∗dh ) ;
9
10 /∗∗
11 ∗ Ca l l b a c k r e g i s t e r e d i n the c l i e n t OpenSSL eng i n e which i s c a l l e d
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12 ∗ when OpenSSL needs the eng i n e to compute the D i f f i e −Hel lman sha r ed
13 ∗ s e c r e t based on D i f f i e −Hel lman parameter s , the s e r v e r p u b l i c key ,
14 ∗ and the c l i e n t ' s p r i v a t e key .
15 ∗
16 ∗ Retu rns the s i z e o f the gene r a t ed sha r ed s e c r e t on
17 ∗ succe s s , −1 on f a i l u r e .
18 ∗/
19 s t a t i c i n t c l ient_compute_key ( uns i gned char ∗ sha r ed_sec r e t ,
20 con s t BIGNUM ∗ publ i c_key , DH ∗dh ) ;
21
22 /∗∗
23 ∗ Bind the c l i e n t eng i n e to OpenSSL l i b r a r y .
24 ∗
25 ∗ Retu rns 1 on succe s s , 0 on f a i l u r e .
26 ∗/
27 i n t c l i e n t_eng i n e_b ind (ENGINE ∗ eng ine , con s t cha r ∗ eng ine_id )
Listing 4.1: Function signatures of the client engine’s main functions
4.5.2 The qkd_engine_server.c file
The qkd_engine_server.c file contains the engine code that is used by the server.
In the file there are implemented three different functions:
• server_generate_key(): this function overload the DH_generate_key()
function. It simply define the pair of private-public keys for the server. Since
the pair of keys is not fundamental for our purposes, I decided to used two
different fixed values, respectively for the private key and the public key.
• server_compute_key(): this function overload the DH_compute_key()
function. This function is fundamental because is the one responsible for
defining the shared-secret, therefore the symmetric key used for the
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communication between the client and the server. The function implements a
server socket listening on the 2333 port (running on localhost), and
waiting to receive the QKD key from the QKD app of the ETSI emulator.
• server_engine_bind(): this function is used to bind the server engine to the
library OpenSSL. It is necessary to call the overload dynamic library instead
of the standard library implementation.
1 /∗∗
2 ∗ Ca l l b a c k r e g i s t e r e d i n the s e r v e r OpenSSL eng i n e which i s c a l l e d
3 ∗ when OpenSSL needs the eng i n e to g en e r a t e a D i f f i e −Hel lman p r i v a t e −
4 ∗ −key and to d e r i v e the D i f f i e −Hel lman p u b l i c key from i t .
5 ∗
6 ∗ Retu rns 1 on succe s s , 0 on f a i l u r e .
7 ∗/
8 s t a t i c i n t s e rve r_gene ra te_key (DH ∗dh ) ;
9
10 /∗∗
11 ∗ Ca l l b a c k r e g i s t e r e d i n the s e r v e r OpenSSL eng i n e which i s c a l l e d
12 ∗ when OpenSSL needs the eng i n e to compute the D i f f i e −Hel lman sha r ed
13 ∗ s e c r e t based on D i f f i e −Hel lman parameter s , the s e r v e r p u b l i c key ,
14 ∗ and the c l i e n t ' s p r i v a t e key .
15 ∗
16 ∗ Retu rns the s i z e o f the sha r ed s e c r e t on succe s s ,
17 ∗ −1 on f a i l u r e .
18 ∗/
19 s t a t i c i n t server_compute_key ( uns i gned char ∗ sha r ed_sec r e t ,




24 ∗ Bind the s e r v e r eng i n e to OpenSSL l i b r a r y .
25 ∗
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26 ∗ Retu rns 1 on succe s s , 0 on f a i l u r e .
27 ∗/
28 i n t s e rve r_eng ine_b ind (ENGINE ∗ eng ine , con s t cha r ∗ eng ine_id )
Listing 4.2: Function signatures of the server engine’s main functions
4.5.3 The qkd_engine_utils.c file
The qkd_engine_client.c file contains the engine code that is common to the
client engine and the server engine. In the file there are implemented three different
functions:
• create_socket(): this function is used to create the server socket running on
the client and the server. The socket is used to communicate with the QKD
app of the ETSI emulator aiming to received the QKD key and use it as shared
secret in the communication between the client and the server.
• close_socket(): this function is used to terminate the socket communication
between the client (or the server) and the QKD app of the ETSI emulator.
• QKD_engine_bind(): this function is the callback of the
client_engine_bind() and the server_engine_bind() functions. This
function uses the engine APIs and the DH engine APIs to overload the
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– ENGINE_set_DH()
1 i n t c r e a t e_socke t ( i n t po r t ) ;
2
3 i n t c l o s e_socke t ( i n t sock ) ;
4
5 /∗∗
6 ∗ Bind the eng i n e to OpenSSL l i b r a r y , r e g i s t e r a l l the eng i n e
7 ∗ f u n c t i o n s .
8 ∗
9 ∗ Retu rns 1 on succe s s , 0 on f a i l u r e .
10 ∗/
11 i n t QKD_engine_bind (ENGINE ∗ eng ine , con s t cha r ∗ eng ine_id ,
12 con s t cha r ∗engine_name , i n t (∗ generate_key ) (DH ∗ ) ,
13 i n t (∗ compute_key ) ( uns i gned char ∗key ,
14 con s t BIGNUM ∗pub_key , DH ∗dh ) )
Listing 4.3: Function signatures of the util engine’s main functions
4.6 QKD + OpenSSL Workflow
The previous section describes the structure of my project, and the
implementation choices for the OpenSSL engine. The whole project is composed
by two parts: the ETSI emulator implemented by UPM to obtain the QKD key,
and my own implementation of an OpenSSL engine to use the QKD key as
pre-shared key to encrypt the communication between two parties. In order to
combine the two processes, I had to "abuse" the existing-based extension
mechanism for Diffie-Hellman, as described in Section 4.5.
As first step to run the project is necessary to run the OpenSSL server through
the bash script start_server.sh. If the server started successfully we get the
message: Starting server in background... OK (PID <server_pid>). The
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file server.out contains debug messages, and output messages, in order to check
the server engine workflow. An example is shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: Example of server.out file. In the first line we can notice that the
server started successfully, and the following lines show the server engine has been
loaded in the OpenSSL library
After started the OpenSSL server, we can run the OpenSSL client, which will
connect to the server, through the bash script run_client.sh. In the meanwhile,
in another shell, we can run the ETSI emulator through the python scrypt
send_key.py. The latter is responsible to run the QKD controller, the QKD
nodes, and the QKD apps to retrieve the QKD key. The file client.out contains
debug messages, and output messages, in order to check the client engine
workflow. The Figure 4.9 shows the client connected to the server successfully, and
the initialization of the TLS handshake. It is interesting to notice that the
client_generate_key() function is computed after the client has received the
ServerHelloDone message.
At this point of the TLS handshake, the ClientKeyExchange message should
be sent by the client. The callback function client_compute_key() is performed
before the latter step is performed, therefore, a listening socket is created, which
waits to receive the QKD key from the QKD app of the ETSI emulator. In the
Figure 4.10 we can see the shared secret (the QKD key) obtained by the ETSI
emulator; keep in mind that this is only a prototype, the choice of a socket to make
the ETSI emulator and OpenSSL communicate is not the most valuable solution
according to security reasons, however, for demonstration purposes is enough to
show the proof of concept.
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Figure 4.9: Example of client.out file. The first lines shows the client successfully
connected to the server, and the client engine has been loaded in the OpenSSL
library. Moreover the first steps of the TLS handshake are shown
Figure 4.10: The client_compute_key() function has been performed: the
OpenSSL client has received the QKD key from the QKD app of the ETSI emulator
Once the client has received the QKD key and the ClientKeyExchange message
is sent, the callback function server_compute_key() is computed. As previously,
a listening socket is created to wait the QKD key from the ETSI emulator. The
Figure 4.11 shows an example of the server receiving the QKD key, and computing
the server_compute_key() function successfully.
Figure 4.11: The server_compute_key() function has been performed: the
OpenSSL server has received the QKD key from the QKD app of the ETSI emulator
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Finally, the last phases of the handshake are performed. The Figure 4.12
represents a successful communication between the OpenSSL server and the
OpenSSL client, using as shared secret the QKD key obtained from the ETSI
emulator.
Notice that TLS 1.2 was used for this simulation, further information on this
implementation choice is given in the next section.
Figure 4.12: Final phases of the TLS handshake, terminated successfully. Both the
client and the server has received the QKD key.
4.7 Encountered Challenges and Limitations
Implementing an engine to introduce QKD in OpenSSL was really challenging for
several reasons. The first reason is related to the complexity of the library. OpenSSL
library is really huge, and hard to understand, in particular, it is not so obvious to
comprehend how to introduce third parties in order to extend it. The GitHub
repository of the Hackathon organized by RIPE labs helped me a lot to get the first
track, however, I found the implementation process very difficult because I had to
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go through the documentation of the library to understand which callback functions
should I have used, and how to code an engine to extend the library. It took me
almost 2 months to fully understand how to develop the process, and how to design
the project.
Another challenge was related to the combination of the ETSI emulator,
implemented by Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, and the OpenSSL engine that
I created. The first one is written in Python code, instead for the latter, I had the
constraint to implement it in C code since it is the main language of the whole
OpenSSL library. I have never had experience in making two different
programming languages communicate, and the most plausible solution for me was
to implement a socket on which the QKD key is passed. This kind of solution
cannot be considered an optimal solution and it has security issues, however, my
goal was not to implement a go-to-market project. A demonstration of the actual
possibility of introducing the QKD technology in a widely used library such as
OpenSSL, was my target.
The last aspect that needs to be considered is the compatibility of the project
that I implemented. The current solution works successfully with TLS 1.2, and
OpenSSL 1.1.1, which are both stable versions. However, OpenSSL is currently
working on a new version of the library, and most of the methods that I used, even
the engine mechanism, are considered deprecated in the new implementation. The
version has not yet obtained a stable state, and the majority of applications are still
based on version 1.1.1. However, an upgrade of my project with the new version of
the OpenSSL library, and with TLS 1.3 should be taken into consideration in the
future.
5 Conclusion
This thesis describes a demonstrative approach to integrate QKD technology into
the OpenSSL library. The first part of the thesis presents the general problem to
the reader: the quantum threat. In particular, Chapter 2 presents the current
state of cryptography, defining asymmetric cryptography as one of the main
cryptographic techniques used by communications and systems. Subsequently, I
explain quantum cryptography and the reasons why it is considered a risk to
classical cryptography. Chapter 2 concludes by presenting two possible
technologies that might be able to address quantum attacks: Post-Quantum
Cryptography and Quantum Key Distribution.
Chapter 3 focuses on the Quantum Key Distribution protocol which is introduced
by Section 2.4. Chapter 3 aims to give general information about the protocol
in order to comprehend the entire context and the technologies involved in my
internship activity. Despite the benefits of Quantum Key Distribution, which seems
to offer unhackable systems and communications, Chapter 3 concludes by presenting
some security issues of Quantum Key Distribution. The security issues presented
make unhackable communications still out of reach.
The first part of the thesis is composed by Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The second
part of the thesis consists of Chapter 4, which describes my activity internship at
Cefriel. Chapter 4 begins by describing the challenge to be solved and the goals of
my internship. Then, I present my solution to integrate QKD technology into the
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OpenSSL library. Firstly, I describe all the technologies involved in my project in
order to fully understand the context, then I present the different implementation
choices, explaining the reasons made to develop the project. A full description of the
project’s workflow is offered as a practical demonstration of my solution. The final
result is not a go-to-market product, however, it aims to demonstrate the feasibility
of integrating QKD technology into a widely used library such as OpenSSL.
Finally, I conclude Chapter 4 by describing the main challenges that I
encountered during the implementation of the project, and the limitations of the
final result. The limitations presented give ideas for possible future works.
5.1 Future works
Section 4.7 concludes Chapter 4 by describing the limitations of my work to integrate
QKD technology into OpenSSL. These limitations from another perspective can be
seen as ideas for possible future works.
This project is composed by two different processes: (i) the ETSI emulator,
implemented with Python language, (ii) and my OpenSSL engine, implemented
with C language. The usage of different programming languages made it hard
combining the two technologies. In order to make the two processes communicate,
I implemented a socket communication, which is used to send the QKD key
retrieved from the emulator. This implementation choice lacks security, however,
this project is just a prototype to demonstrate the feasibility of integrating QKD
technology into TLS communications. Moreover, this limitation is linked to the
challenge presented in Section 3.4: the lack of an adequate security interface
between the end users/applications and the quantum nodes. Thus, finding a
solution to transmit the key from the ETSI emulator to the OpenSSL engine,
means finding a solution for one of the biggest issues in Quantum Key Distribution
networks. Section 2.4.1 mentions Post-Quantum Cryptography: this technology
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can be considered to transmit the key from the quantum nodes to the end
users/applications.
Finally, the solution described here is compatible with TLS 1.2 version, and
OpenSSL 1.1.1 version. Currently, the OpenSSL developers’ community is
implementing version 3 of the library, which supports TLS 1.3 version. TLS 1.2
and OpenSSL 1.1.1 are both stable versions and are used in many services and
communications. The newest version of OpenSSL is not declared stable yet,
therefore, I decided to rely on the most recent stable version of the library.
However, a migration to the latest library version should be considered once
OpenSSL version 3 will be declared stable.
5.2 Future Collaborations
On September 27th, I presented the results obtained in this work to my
supervisors Enrico Frumento, and Francesco Morano from Cefriel. Moreover, at
the final presentation partecipated also Paolo Comi, Fabrizio Bianchi and Maurizio
Barbaro from Italtel.
Italtel has implemented a Software-Defined Networking (SDN) QKD
framework, which abstracts the internal architecture of a QKD system providing a
common standardized middleware. The SDN QKD framework provides a Local
Key Management System and standard interfaces to allow communications
between QKD systems and end applications.
At the end of the presentation, Italtel showed their interest in the project I
presented, and they intend to continue this project by integrating my solution with
the SDN QKD framework, implemented by them, at the beginning of the new year.
I am really satisfied with the results achieved, I knew it was a hard work that
required a lot of effort, but receiving a lot of interest for a project that I implemented
individually paid all the fatigue.
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